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INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT AND THE UNION'S DUTY OF
FAIR REPRESENTATION: THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT'S HOFFMAN STANDARD
RONALD TURNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal labor law is premised on the belief that employees have a
right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing' and that an employer must recognize this right when a majority of
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit designates a union as its
collective bargaining agent.2 Once recognized, the union is clothed with
exclusive authority to negotiate and administer a collective bargaining
agreement with the employer on behalf of all employees in the unit, in-
cluding those who opposed such representation.
A corollary to this exclusive representation theory 3 is the union's
duty of fair representation. Designed to insure that all members of the
bargaining unit are fairly represented in the process of collective bar-
gaining, the United States Supreme Court originally enunciated the duty
in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,4 wherein the Court held that
a labor organization must act "without hostile discrimnation" amongst
members and must "represent all its members, the majority as well as the
minority, and it is to act for and not against those whom it represents."5
* Attorney, Murphy, Smith & Polk, Chicago, Illinois; Research Associate, Industrial Re-
search Unit, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. Magna Cum Laude, Wilber-
force University, 1980; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1984; Member, Illinois Bar.
Formerly Labor-management Relations Examiner, National Labor Relations Board; Research As-
sistant, Legal, Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Co-Au-
thor, FAIR REPRESENTATION, THE NLRB AND THE COURTS (rev. ed. 1984) (The Wharton School,
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1. See § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). [The
National Labor Relations Act is hereinafter referred to as the "Act".]
2. See § 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
3. For a criticism of the exclusive representation theory, see Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclu-
sive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 897 (1975).
4. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Steele arose under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-158
(1982). The doctrine of fair representation was subsequently extended to unions certified under the
National Labor Relations Act. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953).
5. 323 U.S. at 202-03.
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Subsequently, in Vaca v. Sipes,6 the Supreme Court determined that
a "breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a
union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Applying this standard to the
question of what level of union misconduct will support an action for
breach of the duty of fair representation, the majority of the federal
courts of appeals has held that negligent or perfunctory representation by
a union may give rise to unfair representation liability. 7 Rejecting this
analysis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
held that "courts may enforce the duty of a union to fairly represent an
employee only when union conduct breaching that duty is intentional,
invidious, and directed at the employee."' 8 This view, initially set forth in
Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc. ,9 and consistently applied and reaffirmed by the
court, 10 is clearly entrenched as the law of the Seventh Circuit.
This article examines the Seventh Circuit's application of the Hoff-
man intentional misconduct standard in contract administration duty of
fair representation litigation. Part II of the article examines three deci-
sions by the United States Supreme Court" ! which provide the frame-
work for judicial analysis of the requirements of the duty of fair
representation. Part III discusses the normative standards from which
standards of fair representation are derived and the negligence/causation
standard applied by the majority of the courts in fair representation
cases. Part IV examines the Seventh Circuit's establishment and refine-
ment of its intentional misconduct standard, a standard based on prohib-
ited intent and motivation which rejects the theories of negligent and
perfunctory representation recognized by other courts, 12 and concludes
that, although the negligence standard has obvious appeal when viewed
only through the prism of the interests of the individual employee, the
intentional misconduct standard may offer the best accommodation of
individual, union, and management rights which arise in the administra-
tion of collective bargaining agreements.
6. 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
7. See infra notes 35-63 and accompanying text.
8. Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 73-119 and accompanying text.
11. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street,
Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171 (1967).
12. See infra notes 64-123 and accompanying text.
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
II. VACA, LOCKRIDGE, AND HINES: THE "ARBITRARY,
DISCRIMINATORY, OR IN BAD FAITH" TEST
The underlying rationale of the duty of fair representation is that the
imposition of legal liability will ensure that unions "act for and not
against those whom it represents."' 13 Upon a breach of that duty, courts
will impose injunctive relief and appropriate damages. Consequently, the
nature and extent of the union's obligation is of obvious importance' 4
and requires a coherent standard of representation susceptible to rea-
soned and consistent application. 5
Prior to 1967, courts grappled with the formulation of a definitive
standard of fair representation. In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Rail-
road,16 the Supreme Court stated that a union must "exercise fairly the
power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without
hostile discrimination against them." 17 Subsequently, most lower courts
required a showing of "bad faith" arbitrariness, i.e., union action or inac-
tion motivated by bad faith.18
Vaca v. Sipes
In 1967, the Supreme Court's decision in Vaca v. Sipes 19 led to a
major reformulation of the fair representation standard. In Vaca, the
plaintiff, an employee discharged as a result of a physical disability, al-
leged that his termination from employment was in violation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement and that the union had arbitrarily, and
without just cause, refused to take his grievance to arbitration. The
Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed a jury award of compensatory and
punitive damages for the plaintiff. The court reasoned that the question
to be resolved was whether the evidence supported the plaintiff's asser-
tion that he had been wrongfully discharged by the employer, regardless
of the good faith of the union.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Justice White, writing
for the majority, enunciated the tripartite standard that has been gener-
ally accepted as the definitive formulation of the fair representation stan-
13. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
14. T. BOYCE & R. TURNER, FAIR REPRESENTATION, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS 6-7
(rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter Boyce & Turner].
15. Id. at 47-48.
16. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
17. Id. at 203.
18. See. e.g., ILWU v. Kuntz, 334 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964); Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. S.S.
Clerks, 313 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1963); Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 266 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959). See
also Boyce & Turner, supra note 14, at 47-48.
19. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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dard in the contract administration context: "A breach of the statutory
duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a
member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or
in bad faith."' 20  In another important passage, the Court stated that,
"[t]hough we accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ig-
nore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion, ' 21
employees have no absolute right to have a grievance taken to arbitra-
tion. In the Court's view, arbitration of all grievances "would greatly
increase the cost of the grievance machinery and could so overburden the
arbitration process as to prevent it from functioning successfully." '22
Applying this standard of union liability in Vaca, the Court con-
cluded that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation. The
Court found no arbitrary or bad faith conduct on the part of the union
because it diligently supervised the plaintiff's grievance, served as the
plaintiff's advocate, attempted to amass medical evidence of his fitness to
work, and determined that arbitration would be fruitless only after a
medical examination of the plaintiff proved unfavorable. 23 Thus, the
Court concluded that the duty was not breached since "[t]here was no
evidence that any Union officer was personally hostile to [the plaintiff] or
that the Union acted at any time other than in good faith."'24
Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge
Four years later, in Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric
Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge,25 a case ad-
dressing the issue of the National Labor Relations Act's preemption of an
employee's state action against a union, the Court's dictum contained
language crucial to the Seventh Circuit's subsequent formulation of an
intentional misconduct standard: 26
20. Id. at 190 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 191.
22. Id. at 192 (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 193-95.
24. Id. at 194 (footnote omitted). Justice Fortas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Harlan, concurred in the result. In his view, employee complaints of a breach of the duty of fair
representation were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (the
"NLRB" or the "Board"), a position rejected by the majority. Id. at 198 (Fortas, J., concurring).
He opined that jurisdiction should remain with the Board because "[t]he nuances of union-employee
and union-employer relationships are infinite and consequential, particularly when the issue is as
amorphous as whether the union was proved guilty of 'arbitrary or bad faith conduct.'" Id. at 203.
In dissent, Justice Black argued, inter alia, that arbitrariness is "a standard which no one can
define." Id. at 209 (Black, J., dissenting). Noting that the Court did not explain what "arbitrary" or
"bad faith" conduct meant, he concluded that Vaca would create insurmountable obstacles to an
employee's right to sue an employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 210.
25. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
26. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
[t]he doctrine [of the duty of fair representation]... carries with it the
need to adduce substantial evidence of discrimination that is inten-
tional, severe and unrelated to legitimate union objectives [such] that
the risk of conflict with the general congressional policy favoring ex-
pert, centralized administration, and remedial action is tolerably slight
* . . [t]he very distinction.., between honest, mistaken conduct, on the
one hand, and deliberate and severely hostile and irrational treatment,
on the other, needs strictly to be maintained.2 7
This passage suggests that fair representation liability will arise only
when the union deliberately and intentionally engages in conduct which
deprives an employee of his or her right to union assistance. Interest-
ingly, while the elements of discriminatory and bad faith conduct from
the Vaca standard were recognized by the Lockridge Court, the third
element-arbitrary conduct-was not mentioned. Questions arose with
respect to the effect and impact of Lockridge. Did Lockridge reject
Vaca's broadening of the union's duty of fair representation to prohibit
arbitrary conduct, or did the Lockridge Court inaccurately describe or
simply misstate the Vaca standard?28
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight
The Court's next fair representation decision, Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc. ,29 did not cite or discuss Lockridge, much less disavow it.
However, in holding that the finality of an arbitrator's award does not
protect an employer where an employee proves a breach of the duty of
fair representation, the Hines Court relied on Vaca in reaffirming the
proposition "that a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious griev-
ance or process it in a perfunctory fashion."' 30 Writing for the Court,
Justice White, the author of the majority opinion in Vaca, stated that the
Vaca ruling "stemmed from our evaluation of the manner in which the
union had handled the grievance in its earlier stages."' 3' Yet, in other
passages, he queried whether the finality of an arbitration decision "binds
employees who assert that the process has fundamentally malfunctioned
by reason of the bad-faith performance of the union,"' 32 and further
stated that arbitration decisions must not stand where the union's repre-
sentation "has been dishonest, in bad faith or discriminatory. '33
27. 403 U.S. at 301 (citing Vaca, 386 U.S. at 180-81) (emphasis added).
28. For a discussion of this point, see Boyce & Turner, supra note 14, at 52; Comment, The
Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1119, 1122-26 (1973).
29. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
30. Id. at 568-69 (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191).
31. Id. at 569.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 571.
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By not specifically addressing the effect of Lockridge on the tripar-
tite standard of Vaca, the Court injected further uncertainty and ambigu-
ity into fair representation analysis. 34 Notwithstanding this uncertainty,
most courts have rejected the "bad faith only" standard of Lockridge
and, as a result, unions attempting to administer a collective bargaining
agreement in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory manner may still
face fair representation liability for negligent or perfunctory conduct.
III. STANDARDS OF UNION FAIR REPRESENTATION
Normative Standards of Fair Representation
Judicial analysis of a union's duty of fair representation ranges from
an application of standards of ordinary or mere negligence to gross or
egregious negligence to intentional misconduct.35 Negligence standards
have been and are currently recognized by a majority of the federal
courts. Application of these standards necessarily requires that a court
establish minimum standards of representation which unions must meet
to satisfy their duty of fair representation to union employees. These
standards of representation are derived from three norms: (1) the con-
tractual rights norm; (2) the procedural due process norm; and (3) the
duty of care norm.3 6
Derivation of a standard of representation from the contractual
rights norm would impose an absolute duty upon the union to enforce
substantive rights set forth in a collective bargaining agreement. Each
member of the bargaining union could insist that the contract be admin-
istered and enforced to protect his or her rights; thus, any right available
to one employee must be available, on the same terms and basis, to all
employees. As such, a union could breach its duty by declining to file,
process, or arbitrate a grievance that involved and was clearly grounded
in a substantive right contained in a collective bargaining agreement,
even though the union had a principled and rational reason supporting
its action or inaction. The Supreme Court may have intimated as much
in Vaca v. Sipes by noting that a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meri-
torious grievance. 37
34. For example, in Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd as to punitive dam-
ages, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court properly used the tripar-
tite test of Vaca in assessing the union's conduct despite the union's argument that the narrower
Lockridge standard should apply.
35. The intentional misconduct standard, adopted by the Seventh Circuit, is discussed infra in
Part IV of this article.
36. Professors Harper and Lupu identify and discuss these norms in Harper & Lupu, Fair
Representation As Equal Protection, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1254-56 (1985).
37. 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (discussed supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text). Cf Smith v.
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A procedural due process norm of fair representation would require
that a union guarantee that bargaining unit members will be given an
opportunity to be heard before the union renders any decision with re-
spect to a course of action which would affect them. Thus, union actions
taken without regard to the interests or views of individual employees
could constitute unfair representation. 38 This norm may also require that
unions inform employees of their rights under the contract and that es-
tablished procedures prescribed by the contract be adhered to at all
times.
Finally, the imposition of a duty of care norm would require that
unions meet substantive minimum standards in processing grievances
and administering the contract. This norm, similar to the fiduciary du-
ties of a trustee, underlies the Supreme Court's statement in Vaca that a
union may not process a grievance in a perfunctory fashion. 39
Judicial preference for one of the three norms depends, of course, on
the courts' view of their role in establishing externally-imposed standards
of conduct and guidelines for unions engaged in the administration of
collective bargaining agreements. A more stringent standard could have
a greater impact on unions because more resources and administrative
efforts would have to be devoted to insure compliance with that standard.
Such compliance could result in a consequent and involuntary diversion
of union assets from other areas deemed more significant by the union
and, perhaps, its members. Conversely, a relatively lenient standard of
fair representation could result in a lesser degree of judicial intrusion into
union representation of bargaining unit members and, therefore, poten-
tially less protection for the individual employee. Thus, to the extent
that either standard is adopted in the extreme, the duty could become
unduly restrictive for the union or afford inadequate protection to
employees.
The employer's interests are also implicated because the standard of
conduct imposed on a union by a court directly affects the finality of
grievance-arbitration proceedings. As recognized by the Supreme Court
in Hines:
To prevail against either the company or the Union, petitioners must
show not only that their discharge was contrary to the contract but
must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (individual employees acquire legally enforceable rights
under the collective bargaining agreement).
38. See Harper & Lupu, supra note 36, at 1254-55.
39. Harper & Lupu, supra note 36, at 1255-56. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Union. As the District Court indicated, this involves more than dem-
onstrating mere errors in judgment.
... In our view, enforcement of the finality provision... is condi-
tioned upon the Union's having satisfied its statutory duty fairly to
represent the employee in connection with the arbitration
proceedings."0
Thus, all segments of the labor-management community are affected by,
and have a stake in, the normative standards of fair representation ap-
plied by the courts.
The Negligence or Perfunctory Conduct Standard
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, other courts have held that the duty of
fair representation may be breached by arbitrary or negligent conduct.
The case cited most often as an illustration of the negligence standard is
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp. (Ruzicka /).41 In that case, the em-
ployee's suit alleged that the union's failure to timely file a statement of
an unadjusted grievance constituted unfair representation. Holding that
the employee had not demonstrated that the union's inaction was tainted
by hostility, the district court dismissed the complaint. Reversing on ap-
peal, the Sixth Circuit held that a showing of bad faith was not required
for a successful fair representation action. Reasoning that Vaca estab-
lished three separate standards for a breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion, the court concluded that arbitrary union conduct could amount to
unfair representation even where bad faith was not at issue. As stated by
the Ruzicka I court:
Such negligent handling of the grievance, unrelated as it was to the
merits of [the] case, amounts to unfair representation. It is a clear
example of arbitrary and perfunctory handling of a grievance ....
... [W]hen a union makes no decision as to the merit of an indi-
vidual's grievance but merely allows it to expire by negligently failing
to take a basic and required step towards resolving it, the union has
acted arbitrarily and is liable for a breach of its duty of fair
representation .42
The court concluded, therefore, that the union's failure to timely file the
statement of grievance was unfair representation. 43
40. 424 U.S. at 570-71.
41. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
42. Id. at 310.
43. Concurring in the result, Judge McCree argued that negligence did not fall within the arbi-
trary or perfunctory standard of Vaca because the latter standards referred only to intentional con-
duct. However, because he determined that the union's conduct, though unintentional, was
egregious, Judge McCree concluded that the union breached its duty to fairly represent the em-
ployee. Id. at 315-16 (McCree, J., concurring).
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In Ruzicka II, 44 the Sixth Circuit clarified its previous decision, in-
structing that ordinary negligence would not constitute a breach. How-
ever, stated the court, union action taken "without a sound reason for its
decision" would constitute an arbitrary action violative of the duty under
the holding of Ruzicka .4 5 In another decision, the Sixth Circuit re-
cently noted that Vaca "set forth a three-prong test that a union must
meet in order to fulfill its statutory duty to fairly represent its mem-
bers."' 46 The court opined that a union "must conform its behavior to
each of these three standards": (1) it must treat all factions of its mem-
bership without hostility or discrimination; (2) it must exercise its discre-
tion in complete good faith and honesty; and (3) it must avoid arbitrary
conduct.4 7 It is thus clear that the Sixth Circuit has adopted a broad
reading of Vaca and will find certain conduct unlawful even when it is
not the result of hostile motive or discrimination.
Union liability based on an inadvertent failure to timely file a dis-
charge grievance was held to be arbitrary and a breach of the duty by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co. 48 Seeking to limit its holding to those cases in which "the individual
interest at stake is strong and the union's failure to perform a ministerial
act completely extinguishes the employee's right to pursue his claim," '49
the Dutrisac court determined that the union breached its duty because
(1) the employee had been discharged and only the union could file for
arbitration with respect to that employment action and (2) the union's
failure to meet the filing deadline terminated the employee's resort to the
grievance-arbitration procedure. Thus, concluded the court, the union's
unexplained and unexcused failure to timely file the grievance constituted
a breach of the duty of fair representation.
The Ninth Circuit has also made clear that it will require unions to
exercise special care in handling discharge grievances and expects at least
minimal investigation into the facts and merits of employee grievances50 ;
that a union's conduct will not be deemed "arbitrary", and therefore a
breach of the duty, where it errs in evaluating a grievance or interpreting
44. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981).
45. Id. at 1212. On remand, the district court held that the union did not breach its duty of fair
representation because it relied on the parties' past practice of extending time limits in which to file
grievances. 519 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 707 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 982 (1983).
46. NLRB v. Local 299, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 782 F.2d 46, 50 (6th Cir. 1986).
47. Id. at 50-51 (quoting Ruzicka 1, 523 F.2d at 309-10).
48. 749 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 1274.
50. Evangelista v. Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pac., 777 F.2d 1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1642 (1986).
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the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement51 ; that as long as a
union's interpretation of an agreement is reasonable and not made in
reckless disregard of an employee's rights, the court will not second-
guess a decision not to arbitrate a grievance 52; and that a grievant need
not be given notice and an opportunity to be heard in contract interpreta-
tion cases where the collective bargaining agreement does not require
such notice.53 The crucial distinction for the court, as evidenced by the
foregoing, is the nature of the union's conduct: "When the union's con-
duct does not involve a purely ministerial act, but lies within the tradi-
tionally discretionary sphere of grievance evaluation, the union may in
good faith forbear pursuit of a meritless grievance after due investigation
and analysis."'54
Further support for the view that a tripartite standard of fair repre-
sentation governs union conduct is found in Griffin v. UAW. 55 There, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that arbitrary con-
duct, standing alone, is sufficient for a judicial finding of a breach of the
duty. Noting that a union has three distinct obligations under Vaca, the
court stated that a union's pursuit of an unreasonable or arbitrary course
of action may breach the duty even where no showing of hostile motive is
made.5 6 Similarly, in De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajordes Packing-
house 57 and Curtis v. United Transportation Union,58 the Courts of Ap-
peals for the First and Eighth Circuits adopted the majority view that a
union may breach the duty of fair representation without a showing of
hostile motivation.
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
that evidence of bad faith is not a prerequisite for establishing the exist-
ence of unfair representation. NLRB v. Local 282, International Brother-
51. Id. at 1396 n.2; Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985).
52. Evangelista, 777 F.2d at 1396; Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 756 F.2d 1461, 1465
(9th Cir. 1985); Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1985); Peterson v.
Kennedy, 771 F.2d at 1253; Tenorio v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1982).
53. See Evangelista, 777 F.2d at 1397; Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349, 1354
(9th Cir. 1981), disapproved on other grounds, Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462
U.S. 51 (1983). Accord Higdon v. United Steelworkers of Am., 706 F.2d 1561 (1lth Cir. 1983);
Whitten v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 521 F.2d 1335 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 981
(1976).
54. Evangelista, 777 F.2d at 1399 n.5 (citing Eichelberger v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir.
1985)); see also Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1983).
55. 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972).
56. Id. at 183. See also Carpenter v. West Virginia Flat Glass, Inc., 763 F.2d 622, 624 (4th Cir.
1985); Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891 (4th Cir. 1980) (perfunctory
handling of a meritorious grievance may subject union to unfair representation liability).
57. 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
58. 700 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1983). Accord NLRB v. American Postal Workers Union, 618 F.2d
1249 (8th Cir. 1980).
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hood of Teamsters,59 involved the question whether a union breached the
duty of fair representation by providing inadequate notice of an arbitra-
tion award affecting many of its members. Enforcing an NLRB order,
the court concluded that the Board correctly found that the union
breached its fiduciary duty to those workers:
We agree with other courts which have held that arbitrary conduct
amounting to a breach is not limited to intentional conduct by union
officials but may include acts of omission which, while not calculated
to harm union members, "may be so egregious, so far short of mini-
mum standards of fairness to the employee and so unrelated to legiti-
mate union interests as to be arbitrary." 6
The court further stated that it did "not agree that a showing of bad faith
is a prerequisite for establishing the existence of a breach. While it cer-
tainly is a sufficient condition, it is not a necessary one."'61
As indicated above, several courts have applied a standard of fair
representation which requires, at a minimum, that the union investigate
and render a decision on the merits of a grievance. As a practical matter,
a union must use reasonable care in investigating, filing and processing a
grievance; by failing to meet these standards, a union exposes itself to an
after-the-fact examination of the underlying grievance-arbitration pro-
ceeding by the court and potential unfair representation liability.
Under the negligence/causation standard, liability may be imposed
upon the union only where the union's action or inaction is the "solitary
and indivisible cause of the complete extinguishment of [the] employees'
grievance rights.' ' 62 Inherent in the use of such a standard is the intru-
sion of external influences on internal union matters, significant influ-
ences which may affect a union's priorities and distributional judgments.
The union may thus be forced to spend a greater portion of its treasury
on grievance investigation and staffing as a direct result of external no-
tions of "good" and "equitable" representation. 63 A negligence standard
also reflects judicial recognition of a duty of care norm as courts gener-
ally require some form of union consideration of grievances arising out of
work place disputes.
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S INTENTIONAL
MISCONDUCT STANDARD
The issue of external influence on union decisionmaking and after-
59. 740 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1984).
60. Id. at 147 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 148 n.13 (citation omitted).
62. Evangelista, 777 F.2d at 1399 n.5 (quoting Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d at 1254).
63. See Harper & Lupu, supra note 36, at 1272.
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the-fact judicial review is a significant matter crucial to the application of
a negligence/causation standard of fair representation. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit has charted its own course, however, and
has adopted and reaffirmed an intentional misconduct standard which
requires evidence of intentional, severe, and hostile discrimination
against bargaining unit members.
Seventh Circuit jurisprudence with respect to the appropriate legal
standard to be applied in fair representation litigation was, at one time, in
general accord with the views of the majority of the federal courts of
appeals. In Baldini v. Local Union No. 1095, UAW, 64 the court, in an
opinion by Judge Pell, applied the standards of Vaca v. Sipes65 in a hy-
brid section 301/duty of fair representation suit:
Under Vaca ... a union breaches its duty of fair representation when
its conduct towards the member is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in
bad faith." It is noted that the standard is disjunctive. Vaca expressly
rejected an argument that only obvious breaches such as discrimination
or hostile treatment would be actionable. A union may not "arbitrarily
ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory
fashion." '66
Turning to the effect of the Supreme Court's Lockridge decision, 67 the
court stated that "[o]ccasional sentences lifted from their context might
make it seem that invidious hostility or some sort of malice is always
required. '68 The court noted, however, that "the treatment of the issue
in Hines.. . leaves little doubt that such has not become the law. Nor do
we think a fair reading of Lockridge ... to this effect really supports"
such an argument. 69 Similar reasoning was presented in Miller v. Gate-
way Transportation Co. :70
Although evidence of intentionally hostile or invidious action by a
union is clearly relevant to determining whether the duty of fair repre-
sentation has been breached, the duty may be breached without scienter
on the part of the union. "[Platently wrongful conduct such as racial
discrimination or personal hostility" is not the sole measure of what is
prohibited ... A union also breaches its duty when it arbitrarily ig-
nores or perfunctorily processes a grievance. 71
Baldini and Gateway illustrate the Seventh Circuit's previous recog-
64. 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978).
65. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
66. 581 F.2d at 150-51 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
67. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
68. 581 F.2d at 150 n.5 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 150-51.
70. 616 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1980).
71. Id. at 277 n. I1 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court also noted that "the duty of
fair representation is of special importance when a grievance for wrongful discharge is involved." Id.
at 277 n. 12. "A union must especially avoid capricious and arbitrary behavior in the handling of a
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nition of the disjunctive, tripartite standard of Vaca and the court's prior
rejection of Lockridge as the definitive articulation of the test of unfair
representation. 72 However, the question whether Vaca was limited or
narrowed by Lockridge was again presented to the Seventh Circuit, and
the court's intentional misconduct standard emerged.
The lead case establishing the intentional misconduct standard is
Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc. 73 In that case, the union "forgot" to file a re-
quired appeal of a grievance within the contractually-provided five day
period. The Seventh Circuit, affirming the district court's entry of sum-
mary judgment for the union, held that the duty of fair representation
may be enforced by the courts only when the union's conduct is "inten-
tional, invidious, and directed at the employee, ' '74 and that an action for
breach of the duty requires more than a showing that the union failed to
properly process a grievance. In his opinion for the court, Judge Peck of
the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation, expressly relied on the Supreme
Court's statement in Lockridge that a claim of unfair representation
"carries with it the need to adduce substantial evidence of discrimination
that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objec-
tives."' 75 The court determined that a requirement of intentional miscon-
duct is necessary to limit judicial and administrative interference with the
results of grievance and arbitration proceedings.
The Hoffman court posited a second reason for limiting fair repre-
sentation suits to cases involving intentional misconduct by unions: an
employee who succeeds in his or her suit against the union will have the
grievance-arbitration result set aside and may then attempt to prove that
the employer's action breached the bargaining agreement. 76 "Thus, in
many 'unfair representation' suits ... while the union is a putative de-
fendant, the ultimate relief sought by the employee is reinstatement and
back pay."' 77 This consideration concerned the court:
At least insofar as an employee seeks reinstatement and back pay, the
union defendant of a suit for "unfair representation" may have little
reason to vigorously contest the issue of alleged union wrongdoing. To
grievance based on a discharge-the industrial equivalent of capital punishment." Id. (quoting Grif-
fin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972)).
72. But see Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1975)
("the plaintiff must show that the Union's conduct was intentional, invidious and directed at that
particular employee").
73. 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981).
74. Id. at 520 (citing Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971)).
75. Id. at 522 (quoting Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 301).
76. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976) (discussed supra notes 29-33
and accompanying text).
77. Hoffman, 658 F.2d at 522.
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permit an employee to recover because his union "forgot" to follow
required grievance procedures would create an unacceptably high risk
of collusion between union and employee... By permitting actions for
failure to fairly represent only where the employee can show inten-
tional, invidious misconduct by the union, the possibility of collusive
suits is minimized. 78
Accordingly, stated the court, an unfair representation claim cannot be
based solely on acts or omissions that result in employees not receiving a
"fair" hearing on the merits of a grievance. Labeling the employee's suit
as an "action for the union intentionally causing harm to an employee
involved in a grievance proceeding,"' 79 the court instructed that the em-
ployee must present "substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or
dishonest conduct." 80 Because Hoffman involved a case of union forget-
fulness and negligence8 1 and did not "state a claim of arbitrary, discrimi-
natory, or bad faith conduct, '8 2 the district court's judgment against the
employee was affirmed.
As noted, the Hoffman court's holding was grounded on the
Supreme Court's opinion in Lockridge. In the Seventh Circuit's view,
"Lockridge is quite clearly the Supreme Court's most definitive amplifi-
cation of the Vaca language."8 3 Moreover, stated the court, the Supreme
Court's decision in Hines8 4 was not a retreat from the Lockridge Court's
interpretation of Vaca; in its view, Hines "asserted that arbitral decisions
where the union's representation of the employee has been 'dishonest, in
bad faith, or discriminatory' are subject to relitigation. ' '8 5 Thus, con-
cluded the Seventh Circuit, the "arbitrary" standard of Vaca cannot be
less "than the deliberate and severely hostile and irrational treatment of
Lockridge.' '8 6 The court also rejected the analysis of the Sixth Circuit in
Ruzicka 187 and distinguished its prior rulings in Baldini and Gateway.88
With respect to the latter decisions, the court opined that neither of those
cases held that Vaca arbitrariness may be anything less than intentional
wrongdoing, although Baldini dictum did provide to the contrary. 89
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 299).
81. "Mere negligence cannot rise to the level of misconduct necessary to support an action for
breach of the Union's duty of fair representation." Id. at 523.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 522 n.2.
84. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
85. 658 F.2d at 522 n.2 (quoting Hines, 424 U.S. at 571).
86. Id.
87. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text; see also Boyce & Turner, supra note 14, at
59-62.
88. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
89. Hoffman, 658 F.2d at 521. Concurring in the result, Judge Cudahy argued that the court's
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The Hoffman formulation of an intentional misconduct standard
rested on two rationales. First, as discussed in the preceding paragraph,
the Seventh Circuit determined that Supreme Court precedent required
the application of an intentional misconduct standard in duty of fair rep-
resentation cases. This conclusion rested, in turn, on the court's resolu-
tion of the issue of whether the disjunctive, tripartite test of Vaca or the
narrower standard of Lockridge governed. Adopting the latter view, the
Seventh Circuit determined that a finding of hostile, intentional miscon-
duct was a necessary predicate to the successful maintenance of a fair
representation suit. Secondly, Hoffman offered a practical assessment of
the risks faced by the employer in fair representation litigation. In the
court's view, the union had little reason to vigorously contest an em-
ployee's suit against it because the employer would bear the brunt of any
judicial order requiring reinstatement and back pay.90 Collusive suits
would follow, reasoned the court, absent an intentional misconduct
standard.
The Seventh Circuit inexplicably retreated from Hoffman in Rupe v.
Spector Freight Systems, Inc.91 Addressing a discharged employee's un-
fair representation/breach of contract claim, the court, per Judge Esch-
bach, quoted from Vaca: "a union may not arbitrarily ignore a
meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion."' 92 Dividing
the Vaca test into two categories, Judge Eschbach stated, first, that
Vaca's prohibition on discriminatory or bad faith conduct "connotes a
fundamental requirement of evenhanded representation. ' 93 The second
category of arbitrary and perfunctory conduct "may imply a further re-
reliance on the dicta of Lockridge was misplaced because that case dealt with federal preemption of
state common law claims. Further, citing Baldini and Gateway, he stated that the Supreme Court's
decision in Hines, issued five years after Lockridge, did not discuss or cite Lockridge while reaffirm-
ing the Vaca standard that arbitrary conduct is a basis of liability. Thus, opined Judge Cudahy, the
majority's intentional misconduct standard was incorrect. Id. at 523-24 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
Judge Cudahy also argued for adoption of the standard set forth in Baldini: "whether the union was
guilty of malfeasance and whether its conduct was within the range of acceptable performance" by a
union. Id. at 524. He reasoned that the union's failure to process Hoffman's grievance, while unin-
tentional, was only arbitrary and not sufficiently egregious to constitute a breach. Id. at 525.
90. This risk may have been reduced by the Supreme Court's ruling in Bowen v. United States
Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983). In Bowen, the Court held that an employer's liability for damages
suffered by an employee in hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation suits ends at the date at which an
arbitration of the employee's grievance would have been held had the union not breached its duty.
Holding that the union would be responsible for any increase in damages beyond the hypothetical
arbitration date, the Bowen Court opined that this mode of apportionment of damages would pro-
vide an additional incentive for unions to process the warranted claims of its members and would
have a positive effect on the willingness of employers to enter into and comply fully with contractual
grievance-arbitration procedures. Id. at 227.
91. 679 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1982).
92. Id. at 691 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191).
93. Id.
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quirement of basic diligence. It has been argued that even in the absence
of evidence of bad faith or discrimination, the duty of fair representation
may be violated by conduct . . . so acutely perfunctory that it fails to
attain a basic level of acceptable performance" by a union.94 Articulat-
ing a burden of pleading and proof of these standards of actionable con-
duct, the court stated that (1) the establishment of bad faith or
discrimination would require evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dis-
honest conduct, and (2) where lack of diligence is alleged, something
more than mere negligence must be shown. The court concluded that
neither standard had been satisfied in Spector Freight because no direct
evidence of union animosity toward the employee had been demon-
strated. Nor was the union's conduct "so perfunctory as to support an
inference of bad faith."
95
Judge Peck, the author of the Hoffman majority opinion, disagreed
with Judge Eschbach's suggestion that gross negligence by a union could
violate the duty, for, in his view, that very argument had been rejected in
Hoffman:
Hoffman rejects the argument that negligent conduct, whether or not
it may be characterized as "egregious", may be the basis for an action
for failure to fairly represent under Section 301 and makes it unneces-
sary for us to go beyond the question whether the union's conduct was
intentionally "dishonest, in bad faith, or discriminatory." '96
Moreover, stated Judge Peck, any suggestion that lack of diligence or
negligence could be so egregious that it would constitute unfair represen-
tation should also be dismissed:
Concepts of "negligence" or "lack of diligence" by definition refer to
unintentional conduct, and such conduct may not constitute a breach
of the duty to "fairly represent." On the other hand, the adjectives
"arbitrary" and "perfunctory", which have often been used to describe
conduct breaching the duty, by definition refer to intentional conduct
... I do not agree.., that "arbitrary" or "perfunctory" conduct in-
cludes unintentional, negligent conduct.97
In any event, concluded Judge Peck, the question whether gross negli-
gence violates the duty of fair representation had already been answered,
in the negative, by the Seventh Circuit in Hoffman.98
Subsequent decisions returned to the intentional misconduct stan-
94. Id. (citing Hoffman, 658 F.2d at 524 (Cudahy, J., concurring)).
95. Id. at 695.
96. Id. at 696 (Peck, J., concurring) (quoting Hoffman, 658 F.2d at 522 n.2).
97. Id. (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
98. In dissent, Judge Swygert argued that the duty of fair representation requires that a union's
representation be even-handed and diligent; thus, he would affirm the jury's finding that the union
breached its duty by perfunctorily handling the employee's grievance. Id. at 696-98 (Swygert, J.,
dissenting).
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dard. In Cote v. Eagle Stores, Inc. ,99 the employee's claim that the union
unlawfully failed to diligently investigate the facts surrounding her dis-
charge did not escape the Hoffman rule. Lack of diligence does not con-
stitute a breach of the duty, stated the court, for there must be a showing
of intentional and severe discrimination.0 0 Likewise, in Graf v. Elgin,
Joliet & Eastern Railway Co.,101 Judge Posner's opinion for the court
noted that a union breaches the duty of fair representation only if it re-
fuses to represent an employee deliberately and without justification.
"Negligence, even gross negligence . . . is not enough; and, obviously,
intentional misconduct may not be inferred from negligence, whether
simple or gross. . . . [e]xtreme recklessness is so close to intentional
wrongdoing that the law treats it as the same thing .... ,"102
Superczynski v. P. TO. Services, Inc. 103 involved yet another return
to the issue of the applicable standard of fair representation in cases in-
volving a union's administration of a collective bargaining agreement.
The Seventh Circuit again instructed that Hoffman "is the law of this
circuit regarding the proof required of a plaintiff seeking to establish a
breach of fair representation in an individual grievance proceeding...
The union's misconduct must be intentional." 10 4 Judge Bauer's opinion
for the court reviewed the analysis set forth in earlier Seventh Circuit
opinions interpreting the Supreme Court's decisions in Vaca, Lockridge,
and Hines.0 5 In his view, those cases indicated that Hoffman correctly
set "a stringent standard for proof of a union's breach."' 1 6 Judge Bauer
also expressly rejected the holdings and analyses of Baldini, Gateway,
and Spector Freight. "Hoffman is controlling; a union member must
show that his union deliberately failed to properly pursue his claim
against the company."' 0 7
Notwithstanding the entrenchment of Hoffman as the definitive
99. 688 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1218 (1983).
100. Id. at 34. The court did not discuss its detour in Spector Freight. See also United Steel-
workers of Am. v. NLRB, 692 F.2d 1052, 1057 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) ("A union breaches the
duty ... if it acts on 'arbitrary, hostile, or bad faith grounds.' " (quoting Hoffman, 658 F.2d at 522))
("[o]nce having undertaken to process an employee's grievance, a union may not arbitrarily ignore it
or handle it in a perfunctory manner").
101. 697 F.2d 771, 778 (7th Cir. 1983), later appeal, 790 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1986).
102. Id. at 778 (citations omitted). In Graf, a case arising under the Railway Labor Act, the
local chairman of the union inadvertently failed to submit an appeal challenging the employee's
discharge for falsification of forms. Judge Posner found that the union official was not "trying to do
in" the plaintiff, nor did his memory lapse "signify such a reckless indifference ... that it can be
called intentional misconduct." Id. at 779.
103. 706 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1983).
104. Id. at 202 (citations omitted).
105. See supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
106. 706 F.2d at 203.
107. Id.
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standard in the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs continued to bring, and the
court continued to reject, unfair representation claims brought under
negligence theories. 08 The court recently received yet another opportu-
nity in Camacho v. Ritz-Carlton' Water Tower. 109 There, an employee
discharged for leaving work early was represented at a grievance hearing
by a union business agent. The grievance was denied at the hearing and
the union declined to take the employee's case to arbitration. Alleging
that the union business agent was such an inferior advocate that he was
denied fair representation, the employee filed suit. The district court
granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that
the employee had not established that the union engaged in intentional
misconduct.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. In his opinion for the
court, Judge Easterbrook declined the plaintiff's request to overrule
Hoffman and replace it with a causation standard: a union "is not liable
• . . for careless or bone-headed conduct. When the prohibition is di-
rected against the motive rather than the result, it is necessary to use the
standard of intent or recklessness (from which intent may be in-
ferred)."' 10 He also rejected the plaintiff's argument that Hoffman
should be overruled as inconsistent with Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight. 111 Judge Easterbrook noted that Hines summarized the nature of
the union's breach as that which is based on lack of good faith and hon-
esty, dishonest and bad faith representation, or malfeasance.I Hines, he
concluded, "did not consider the question we address today, but the lan-
guage of Hines does not cast Hoffman to the wolves." ' 1 3
Four rationales were offered by Judge Easterbrook in support of the
intentional misconduct standard. First, he stated that any other stan-
dard would involve the courts in the merits of employment decisions:
A court could not implement a standard based on causation-Did per-
functory handling cause an employee to lose a meritorious griev-
108. See, e.g., Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983). In Dober, Judge
Posner, writing for the court, applied Hoffman in a case involving a plaintiff's challenge of the
union's conduct in representing him at a grievance hearing. Noting that Dober was not a case in
which the union failed to properly represent a worker because he was in disfavor with the union, or
was not a union member, or was a member of a racial or minority group, Judge Posner instructed
that the Seventh Circuit limits suits for breach of the duty to instances of intentional misconduct;
inept, lackluster, or careless representation is not enough. Id. at 294.
Concurring, Judge Cudahy again maintained that the Supreme Court's Vaca standard could not
be narrowed to intentional misconduct. Id. at 297 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
109. 786 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3282 (1986).
110. Id. at 244 (citation omitted).
11i. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
112. 786 F.2d at 246.
113. Id.
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ance?-without deciding which grievances are meritorious and which
are not. That would move the locus of decision from the grievance-
arbitration process to the courts, and the movement would both violate
the contractual allocation of decision making power and undermine
the national policy favoring nonjudicial disposition of labor
disputes. 114
Second, continued Judge Easterbrook, a negligence/causation standard
would interfere with the right of employees to choose the level of care
they were willing to "pay" for. Business agents are not lawyers or pri-
vate investigators, he noted, and a higher quality of representation would
require a greater expenditure of limited union funds which may be allo-
cated for a strike fund or other union function.
Third, Judge Easterbrook concluded that a union could determine,
without breaching its duty, that "the employees as a group are better off
displaying a cooperative and conciliatory spirit than showing arms in
every encounter over a discharge." 1 5 Imposition of a causation standard
would compel a union to change its resource allocation which, in turn,
would undercut the right of employees "to control their own destiny." 1 6
The causation standard could also result in an increase in the level of
grievances pursued through the grievance-arbitration procedure, and em-
ployers could seek to reduce employee access to the grievance machinery;
thus, argued Judge Easterbrook, a union must be able to settle grievances
short of arbitration. In his view, any resulting dissatisfaction with a re-
duced level of representation could be remedied by the employees' instal-
lation of a new representative.
Finally, Judge Easterbrook reasoned that because a union has little
incentive to cooperate with the employer in litigation when the plaintiff
offers the union immunity, the Hoffman standard protects employers
from the risk of union-employee collusion. Although noting that the
employer's liability for damages has been limited in fair representation
cases, 117 he opined that a union and employee are not prevented from
joining together against the employer. Thus, although other circuits
have adopted a negligence/causation standard, 818 the Ritz-Carlton court
reaffirmed that Hoffman governs and will continue to govern in the Sev-
enth Circuit until the Supreme Court resolves the split among the
circuits. 119
114. Id. at 244 (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 245.
116. Id.
117. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 222 (1983) (discussed supra note 90).
118. See supra Part III.
119. Ritz-Carlton, 786 F.2d at 246. Judge Cudahy, registering his continuing disagreement with
the Hoffman rule, nevertheless concurred that Hoffman is the rule in the Seventh Circuit. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit's formulation of the Hoffman standard reflects
an approach by the Court which is attractive in several respects. Hoff-
man establishes a clear and easily applicable fair representation standard
by which a union's conduct may be measured and thus eliminates the
confusion and difficulty often expressed by courts attempting to define
and apply broad notions such as "arbitrariness" and "negligence". In
addition, greater finality will be afforded the contractual grievance-arbi-
tration machinery where it is more difficult for aggrieved employees to
establish a breach of the union's duty of fair representation, for the em-
ployees must first overcome the doctrinal hurdle of demonstrating un-
lawful representation before challenging the underlying employer action.
Further, an intentional misconduct standard may allow unions more
flexibility in making both routine and difficult decisions with respect to
administration of the collective bargaining agreement. By requiring a
showing of deliberate and hostile motivation, the Seventh Circuit has re-
duced the practical need of the union to measure its conduct in terms of
potential subsequent exposure to fair representation litigation, a consid-
eration which may otherwise lead to the arbitration of a greater number
of grievances.1 20 Thus, the Hoffman standard may promote the finality
of employment decisions as determined by the contractual grievance-ar-
bitration procedure.
Interestingly, an additional factor suggested by Judges Posner and
Easterbrook, that of extreme recklessness, arguably encompasses conduct
which would otherwise fall outside of the intentional misconduct stan-
dard of Hoffman. In Graf, Judge Posner opined that extreme reckless-
ness is so close to intentional misconduct that "the law treats it as the
same thing."1 21 Likewise, in Ritz-Carlton, Judge Easterbrook noted that
the "standard of intent or recklessness (from which intent may be in-
ferred)" is the proper standard to be applied in fair representation
(Cudahy, J., concurring). See also NLRB v. Local 139, Operating Eng'rs, 796 F.2d 985, 993 (7th
Cir. 1986) ("this court interprets Vaca v. Sipes as requiring intentional union misconduct to show a
breach of the duty of fair representation").
For examples of district court application of Hoffman, see Mechmet v. Four Seasons Hotels,
Ltd., 639 F. Supp 330 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Gorski v. Local Union 134, IBEW, 636 F. Supp 1174 (N.D.
Il1. 986); Wagner v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Harbers v. Shop 'N Save
Warehouse Foods, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. Il. 1985); Williams v. National Can Corp., 603 F.
Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Faraciano v. Miller Brewing Co., 582 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D. Wis. 1984);
Kaftantzis v. D & L Transp. Co., 531 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
120. Union attorneys have stated that it is "much cheaper and more sensible to arbitrate cases of
doubtful merit than to go to the greater expense and more time-consuming effort involved in defend-
ing a breach case in court." Schwartz, Different Views of the Duty of Fair Representation, 34 LAB.
L.J. 415, 425-26 (1983). Thus, the grievance-arbitration machinery of a collective bargaining agree-
ment would be overwhelmed by the large influx of grievances with a consequent increase in the costs
of administering the bargaining agreement.
121. 697 F.2d at 778 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 101-102.).
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cases. 122 These references to recklessness raise the questions of what con-
stitutes sufficiently reckless conduct, and whether unintentional conduct
by the union can amount to reckless, and therefore unlawful, conduct.
Suppose, for example, that a union official repeatedly "forgets" to timely
file grievances on behalf of employees and that the union, aware of this
problem, does nothing to correct it. Is this "reckless" conduct as that
term is understood by the judges? Is a reckless conduct standard any
more susceptible to consistent application than an arbitrary or perfunc-
tory standard?
Hoffman represents a minority view with respect to the standard to
be applied in contract administration duty of fair representation cases.
As set forth above, the Seventh Circuit has reasoned that the intentional
misconduct standard operates to promote the federal labor policy of non-
judicial disposition of labor disputes while protecting the decision-mak-
ing power of both unions and workers. Further, in the court's view, the
Hoffman standard eliminates the possibility of collusion between em-
ployee and union and thus protects the employer from litigation directed
more at regaining the employee's job than at proving unfair representa-
tion by the union. By narrowing the fair representation standard and
limiting union and employer exposure to liability, the Seventh Circuit
rule best accommodates the interests of those segments of the labor-man-
agement community.
When viewed only through the prism of employee interests, of
course, the Seventh Circuit's standard may appear less attractive. The
Hoffman standard may not have the equitable appeal of the negligence/
causation standard adopted by other courts because of the seemingly
harsh result of a complete foreclosure of an employee's appeal of an ad-
verse employment decision where a union inadvertently fails to process a
grievance. Moreover, Hoffman rejects the normative standards of con-
tractual rights, procedural due process, and duty of care, 123 for it excuses
all union conduct not motivated by discriminatory or other invidious rea-
sons. Thus, absent a "smoking gun", employees will face an unfriendly
judicial reception when pursuing hybrid section 301/duty of fair repre-
sentation cases in courts within the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit.
V. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit has charted its own course in duty of fair repre-
sentation cases involving the administration of collective bargaining
122. 786 F.2d at 244.
123. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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agreements. In adopting an intentional misconduct standard, the court
has consistently held that a union does not breach its duty of fair repre-
sentation in the absence of evidence demonstrating that the union acted
in a deliberate and discriminatory fashion. This view of the doctrine of
fair representation, while contrary to the view of the majority of the fed-
eral courts of appeals, is, and will remain, the definitive analysis applied
by the Seventh Circuit. As Judge Easterbrook stated in Ritz-Carlton,
"[o]ne day the Supreme Court will resolve these recurring differences...
[u]ntil that day, however, Hoffman stands."'124
124. Ritz-Carlton, 786 F.2d at 246.
